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Abstract12
We present a model for benchmarking risk analysis and risk based decision13
making practice within organisations. It draws on behavioural and normative risk14
research, the principles of capability maturity modelling and our empirical15
observations. It codifies the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making16
within a framework that distinguishes between different levels of maturity. Application17
of the model is detailed within the selected business functions of a water and18
wastewater utility. Observed risk analysis and risk based decision making practices are19
discussed, together with their maturity of implementation. The findings provide20
academics, utility professionals, and regulators a deeper understanding of the practical21
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and theoretical underpinnings of risk management, and how distinctions can be made22
between organisational capabilities in this essential business process.23
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1. Introduction26
The provision of safe, reliable drinking water, the overarching goal of the water27
utility sector (AWWA et al. 2001), is within the bounds of the developed world’s28
science, technology, and financial resources. Nevertheless, a nagging prevalence of29
water quality-related outbreaks remains in the developed world, with “causes” ranging30
from technical failures to institutional lapses and, in the extreme, negligence on the part31
of operating and managerial staff (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004). Regardless of the32
manifestation of these incidents, one might argue that excepting “acts of God,” they all33
derive, fundamentally, from a limited organisational capacity in learning how to34
prevent failures; in failures to proactively manage risk.35
Conventionally, utilities manage risk through codifying standard design and36
operating procedures. Procedures develop with the introduction of improved methods37
and technologies (e.g. novel treatment processes) and by reflecting on past mishaps.38
From a risk management perspective, we are particularly concerned with the latter. A39
developmental cycle begins with a contamination event or near miss, following which40
incident analysis is undertaken to determine its root cause, concluding with a technical,41
operational or administrative solution (e.g. adapting design standards or operating42
procedures) designed to prevent its recurrence. This cycle exists at the individual43
utility and sector level, the latter reflected in changes to national or sector-wide codes,44
standards or regulations where learning is generalised; for example, regarding the45
pathogenic hazards associated with backwashing treatment filters. Whilst this46
retrospective approach to managing risk is necessary, it is a mistake to consider it47
sufficient for risk management. Procedures can proliferate to the point where resources48
are diverted towards preventing incidents that have happened, rather than those most49
likely to happen in the future (Lee, 1998). Further, a reliance on learning by trial and50
error, in isolation of more proactive strategies, is unsound where public health is at51
stake because it is not protective. Although illustrated in a water quality context, this52
argument extends to all aspects of the design, operation and management of utility53
systems (e.g. from process engineering to occupational health and safety management)54
and across many industrial (water, waste, energy, transport) sectors.55
Recognition of the limitations of post-hoc analysis is shifting the water sector56
towards proactive risk management, wherein utilities identify potential weaknesses and57
eliminate root causes of problems before failure occurs (MacGillivray et al., 2006;58
Hamilton et al., 2006; Pollard et al., 2004). Our research (Pollard et al., 2004; 2006;59
Hrudey et al., 2006; Pollard et al., 2007; MacGillivray et al., 2007a/b) has been60
concerned with how we can improve organisational competencies in risk management61
within the utility and related sectors. We have focussed on implementation rather than62
the technical aspects of the risk and decision analysis techniques employed and here,63
we introduce a model for benchmarking and improving the processes of risk analysis64
and risk based decision making within utilities. We describe its application within a65
water and wastewater utility, and end by reflecting on our theoretical and empirical66
contributions.67
.68
69
2. Benchmarking risk analysis and risk based decision making70
Capability maturity models (Paulk, 1993) are simplified representations of71
organisational disciplines (e.g. software design and engineering) that codify industry72
practice within a maturity framework. They allow distinctions to be made between73
organisational capabilities (e.g. the ability to manage risk) by reference to the maturity74
of the processes applied. We have published the design (MacGillivray et al., 2007a)75
and application (MacGillivray et al., 2007b) of a capability maturity model for76
benchmarking risk management practice within the utility sectors. This model77
contained eleven risk management processes at five maturity levels. The premise of the78
maturity levels was that once each process was enshrined in procedure, with staff79
trained in their application, roles and responsibilities assigned, necessary resources80
secured, and mechanisms in place to prevent deviations from requirements and to learn81
from the feedback obtained, then implementation of risk management should be of82
consistently high quality. The demonstrable maturity of risk management then83
becomes the benchmark of an organisation’s capability to manage risk, rather than84
simply the presence of risk policies, techniques or champions.85
We have since revised the model, responding to theoretical and empirical86
challenges derived from its application (see MacGillivray, 2007c). Our revision87
follows the spirit of the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Straus88
and Corbin, 1994), drawing primarily upon:89
(i) the capability maturity modelling and quality management literatures;90
(ii) normative risk analysis and management frameworks, both specific to the91
water and wastewater sectors and beyond;92
(iii) behavioural research on decision making under uncertainty; and93
(iv) our recent empirical observations.94
A revised model, described here, incorporates risk analysis and risk based95
decision making, which are comprised of distinct practices. Risk analysis (Fig. 1;96
Table 1) comprises the practices of system characterisation, hazard identification,97
exposure assessment, control evaluation, consequence evaluation, likelihood98
evaluation, and risk evaluation. Risk analysis looks to the future to determine what can99
go wrong and how, the potential consequences and the relative likelihood of this, and100
finally the overall level of risk. Risk analysis is always part of a decision context (Aven101
and Kørte, 2003). Risk based decision making (Fig. 1; Table 2) is concerned with the102
identification and evaluation of risk management options and a managerial review prior103
to selecting the optimal option(s). It is informed by criteria that establish the104
acceptability of risk and that set out stakeholder values and concerns, which are used to105
assess the relative merit of alternative options.106
Both processes are presented in five maturity levels, from ad hoc to adaptive,107
characterised by the completeness of the process (i.e. whether all practices are108
undertaken) and attributes that reflect the maturity of implementation. Maturity levels109
codify the extent to which each process is repeatable (level 2; L2), defined (L3),110
controlled (L4) and adaptive (L5). Whilst the maturity attributes (Table 3) and levels111
(Table 4) are specific to risk analysis, the same principles apply to risk based decision112
making. Note, that to achieve a given maturity level, all positive requirements of that113
level and the preceding levels must first be satisfied.114
115
3. Research methods116
What can individual utilities learn about their organisational risk management117
maturity and how should they respond? How far should they go to improve risk118
management and what actions should they take? One water and wastewater utility119
participated in this case study. The provision of safe, reliable drinking water depends120
on a range of business functions spanning the design, operation and management of121
water supply, wastewater treatment systems. We view the integration of risk122
management across the breadth of these business functions as crucial to delivering a123
high level of competency in public health protection. Though the focus of our research124
is water quality, by the nature of the utility’s organisation, it extended to aspects of their125
wastewater services. We critically assessed seven business functions: engineering;126
project management; drinking water quality management; network planning; asset127
management; emergency management; and occupational health and safety. The128
research methods included interview and document analysis, as described below.129
Semi-structured interview templates were developed and applied by business130
function (e.g. asset management) and, where judged relevant, by functional discipline131
(e.g. dam safety management). Questions explored the practical form of risk132
management in each business function (e.g. “what is the process for identifying health133
and safety hazards within workplaces?”) and its maturity of implementation (e.g. “are134
there mechanisms for quality control of risk analyses?”). Interviews (mean approx. 45135
min.) were conducted face to face (n = 32) and by ’phone (n = 1), recorded, and136
transcribed verbatim (with two exceptions, where notes were taken). Transcripts were137
returned to each interviewee, for comment. Finally, relevant company documentation138
was obtained from interviewees, the corporate intranet and the public domain (e.g.139
internet, conference articles). This included risk management policies and frameworks,140
risk analysis procedures and methods, accident and incident statistics and reports, water141
safety plans and risk analysis outputs.142
Each business function’s process maturity was assessed according to the lead143
author’s judgement based on the data obtained, by reference to our model. We consider144
the subjectivity of this to be unimportant, because the principal research objective was145
to refine the model and illustrate its application, not necessarily to derive a maturity146
assessment of auditable rigour. Mechanisms to validate our findings were adopted,147
including sample anonymity and triangulation. Anonymity removed the potential for148
conflicts with the goal of adding to the body of knowledge on risk management149
capability (as opposed to the participant’s potential desire that findings reflected150
positively on their organisation). Triangulation was secured through interviewing a151
range of representatives from each business function and cross-checking for152
inconsistencies in accounts, cross-checking interviewee accounts with documented153
sources, and providing the interviewees an opportunity to comment on drafts of the154
research outlined in this paper. Of the seven functions evaluated, “emergency155
management” was excluded from the analysis due to contradictions in the data and the156
limited sample of interviewees (two, compared to a minimum of three elsewhere),157
whilst “network planning” was excluded because of limited documentation obtained.158
159
4. Results160
We begin by summarising and discussing the observed risk analysis practices,161
before evaluating their relative maturity of implementation. We then turn to risk based162
decision making.163
4.1. Risk analysis: observed practices164
Table 5 summarises risk analysis practice within the sub-sample of business165
functions examined. Below, we provide a critical evaluation of the strengths and166
limitations of a selection of these practices.167
4.1.1. Hazard identification168
The business functions within this utility adopted a range of hazard identification169
methods, each with their own strengths, limitations and application contexts. In170
occupational health and safety management for example, hazard identification was171
concerned with identifying physical, chemical and biological threats. These were172
primarily identified using checklists linking known hazards with processes, equipment,173
workplaces, or operations, and supplemented with “judgement formed from experience174
and knowledge of the work, past incident records, brainstorming, and system175
engineering techniques.” The approach acknowledges the value of checklists in176
contexts where there is a significant body of knowledge or experience on the range and177
nature of potential hazards, and the notion that it is inappropriate to base hazard178
identification solely on lessons learned from the past, because hazards and the contexts179
in which they arise are fundamentally dynamic.180
System engineering techniques were applied within the engineering function.181
Here, hazard identification was concerned with determining the root causes by which182
engineered systems may fail to operate within their design specifications. This was183
reflected in the utility’s use of hazard and operability studies (HAZOP). In brief,184
analysts examined a process (e.g. disinfection) subdivided into nodes. At each node,185
the analysts applied guidewords (e.g. low, high) to process parameters (e.g.186
temperature, pressure, flow) to identify ways in which the process may deviate from its187
design intention.188
In contrast, neither prescription nor a definitive methodological structure was189
evident in project management’s approach to hazard identification, which was190
concerned with threats to the delivery of projects to time, to budget, and within the191
required quality parameters. Reflecting the unique nature of projects and their related192
hazards, this function adopted facilitated group brainstorming, informed by generic risk193
categories (e.g. “economic / business risk: the risk of exceeding project budget due to,194
for example, the impact of unfavourable exchange rates on the cost of minerals”) to195
stimulate dialogue and encourage a systematic and creative approach to hazard196
identification.197
4.1.2. Exposure assessment198
The existence of a hazard does not constitute a risk because each hazard199
requires a pathway (a sequence of events, actions, or processes) that, if available, leads200
to its realisation at a receptor. Whilst hazard identification is concerned with what can201
go wrong (e.g. introduction of hydrocarbons within a water supply system), exposure202
assessment examines the how and why (e.g. off-take water contaminated via oil203
emissions from inadequately maintained pumps or pipes, due to an absence of204
procedures or inadequate supervision and training of maintenance staff). It involves205
identifying possible routes to and causes of failure.206
Consider the drinking water quality management function within our case study207
utility, where risk analysis was based on an adaptation of the hazard analysis and208
critical control points (HACCP) methodology. The method seeks to provide a basis for209
understanding and prioritising human health and aesthetic hazards within the water210
supply chain from catchment to tap. Within the function, knowledge of the211
environmental behaviour of hazards (e.g. the environmental fate and transport of212
pathogens) and the system under examination, technical judgement, incident reports,213
survey maps, and monitoring records was synthesised to link hazards within each214
subsystem (e.g. catchment: chlorine resistant pathogens) to their sources (e.g. dairy215
farming or grazing) and to the chain of events that may lead to their realisation (e.g.216
runoff or percolation from land based activities).217
Whilst variable in rigour and method, a common theme was that each function’s218
approach to exposure assessment – where evident – tended to focus on how failure219
events may arise, rather than addressing the in-depth root causes. They neglected to220
explore the reasons why human or technical systems fail. This is an important oversight221
in that easily predictable causes of failure are often manifestations of deeper,222
underlying weaknesses (Reason, 1997). An inability to understand causal paths to223
failure constrains the development of risk management options targeted at the root224
causes of risks. Indeed, this should be the guiding basis of HACCP – in that risk (rather225
than hazard) management should focus at the critical points of management control;226
that is on those processes whose failure is likely to drive the risk (Hrudey et al., 2006).227
4.1.3. Consequence evaluation228
This practice involves identifying the nature of the consequences that follow a229
hazardous event (e.g. financial, environmental) and assessing the severity of impact. A230
range of techniques, from quantitative modelling to qualitative ranking were applied231
within our sub-sample of business functions. Applications of the former were restricted232
to asset management (e.g. event tree analysis, dam break modelling, inundation233
mapping, and economic impact evaluations in major dam risk analysis), with the234
majority of evaluations of the impact being single point estimates framed by risk235
ranking techniques. These techniques presented consequences according to the nature236
of their impact (e.g. financial, environmental), and a graded scale of severity expressed237
by descriptive benchmarks. Their application within the sub-sample of business238
functions was not typically underpinned by an analytical method, relying instead on the239
interpretation of limited data sets (e.g. in occupational health and safety: cost of claims,240
lost time due to incidents) to derive a credible consequence evaluation. Whilst this is241
often a practical necessity, the indeterminacy intrinsic to this approach provides scope242
for individuals to bias (inadvertently or not) consequence evaluations, often in subtle243
and difficult to detect ways such that risk analysis outcomes may reflect the desires of244
vested interests (e.g. to secure funds, or to divert attention from flaws) rather than the245
corporate good. Such concerns are not unique to consequence evaluation, and provide246
a powerful rationale for quality control of the risk analysis process, which we discuss in247
section 4.2.4 below.248
4.1.4. Likelihood evaluation249
This involves evaluating the probability that a hazardous event will occur and250
lead to a defined severity of consequence. In drinking water quality management,251
analysts sought to characterise the likelihood of hazardous events occurring and leading252
to a derogation of water quality standards or guidelines. Such judgements were253
informed by historic frequencies of exceedence (e.g. from turbidity monitoring data, E.254
coli concentrations). In some cases, these were supplemented by analysing critical255
variables. For example, evaluations of the likelihood of climatic and seasonal256
variations leading to excess levels of suspended solids in source waters were informed257
by analysis correlating the historic loadings of suspended solids with flow and rainfall258
data. However, whilst comprehensive monitoring of water quality parameters within259
catchments and at customer taps was routine, the absence of an overarching monitoring260
philosophy rooted in preventative risk management, at the treatment and disinfection261
plant level meant that the datasets characterising hazards within water supply systems262
were incomplete. As one interviewee noted, “we do have online monitoring…but263
traditionally it’s been a fairly ad hoc process…no-one has really taken a holistic264
view…and said – I think we should have online [pH] monitors here, chlorine residual265
analysers [here and]…for these reasons.”266
A similar theme emerged in occupational health and safety, whose risk analysis267
procedure stated that likelihood evaluations “may be determined using statistical268
analysis and calculations,” but “where no past data exists or is available, subjective269
estimates will be required to reflect an individual’s or groups degree of belief” that a270
particular severity of consequence will occur. It further specified that experiments and271
prototypes and economic, engineering or other models may be used to minimise272
subjective bias. Our observations revealed that modelling (e.g. event tree analysis) was273
restricted to isolated applications, whilst the availability of historic data (e.g. frequency274
rates by injury type, mechanism of injury, etc.) was paradoxically constrained by the275
organisation’s good health and safety record. As one interviewee offered: “the amount276
of information that we generate doesn’t produce sufficient data for us to analyse…and277
that’s not necessarily because of a lack of reporting, it’s just that…we actually don’t278
produce that many incidents.” This was offset, in part, by reference to external data279
sources (e.g. national health and safety databases). However, these fail to reflect the280
unique nature of the utility’s design, construction, operation, and maintenance practices281
and, more broadly, their working culture.282
4.2. Risk analysis: maturity of implementation283
Having summarised (Table 5) and discussed the business functions’ risk analysis284
practices, we now consider their maturity of implementation. Within each business285
function, the requirements of Level 2 maturity in risk analysis (Table 4) were satisfied286
(Fig. 2). A repeatable process was in place, characterised by explicit critical risk287
analysis practices. Level 2 is limited in two fundamental ways. One is that the key288
practices of exposure assessment and control evaluation may be absent or undertaken289
implicitly. With the exceptions of engineering and drinking water quality management,290
this was true across our sub-sample (see Table 5). This is significant because a291
knowledge of the pathways by which hazards are realised and of the weaknesses in the292
design, operation and management of existing controls, is a prerequisite to developing293
risk management options targeted at common and root causes of failures that are yet to294
arise. A further defining L2 characteristic is that the rigour and quality with which295
critical practices are performed depends in large part on individuals that execute and296
manage the work, and may therefore vary considerably. Additionally, the techniques297
adopted may be retrospective and historical, regardless of their applicability or298
currency. This is because they do not fully satisfy the requirements of a defined (L3),299
controlled (L4) or adaptive (L5) process. However, fully is the key word here, as we300
observed each function exhibiting some of the higher level maturity attributes and so301
our characterisation may be somewhat harsh. We now discuss specific attributes of302
their maturity in risk analysis.303
4.2.1. Initiation criteria304
Within many sectors, there are accepted standards of performance and codes of305
practice that, if adhered to, provide high degrees of control (UKOOA, 1999; Pollard et306
al., 2004). These standards are applied in familiar and well-characterised situations307
where uncertainties and system vulnerabilities are well understood. Adhering to the308
historic basis for safe operations can be considered as discharging the risk management309
duty (Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003; UKOOA, 1999). Returning to our sample of310
business functions, this concept was reflected in an electrical engineer’s comments:311
“electricity is a dangerous thing, it’s a source of high energy that can be released312
instantaneously. Obviously you need to be in control and protected satisfactorily to313
make sure that there’s no risk to personnel or the property…because the technology is314
very mature…we have our own design guidelines [for electrical engineering] that315
actually emphasise…issues like lifecycle cost, security of operation, reliability,316
safety…[and so on] I don’t think it is necessary to have a formalised [risk analysis]317
process [in electrical engineering], because it’s part and parcel of the detailed design318
anyway.”319
However, complex, uncertain and novel systems, with the potential to deviate320
from routine operation, may require risk analysis, so as to better understand what drives321
the risk from or to the plant, process or operation (UKOOA, 1999; Pollard et al., 2004).322
This principle extends beyond technical systems to embrace all aspects of managing a323
water utility. As such, a L3 attribute is the existence of initiation criteria: criteria that324
initiate the application and revision of risk analysis. Criteria observed within our sub-325
sample included: undertaking project risk analyses prior to full financial approval326
depending on the cost, complexity and novelty of the project; undertaking manual327
handling risk analyses in occupational health and safety management for novel, altered328
or relocated processes or in response to high frequency injury records or employee329
requests; undertaking HAZOP studies within engineering for complex or costly330
processes at set stages of design completeness. Timescales for revising risk analyses of331
various asset classes were observed in asset management. These criteria acknowledge332
that risk analysis is not a one-off activity, but requires regular revision to reflect system333
changes and the improved understanding of risks, that inevitably develops over time334
(e.g. from monitoring data, increased operator experience). In a world becoming335
obsessed with “the risk management of everything” (Power, 2004), an absence of these336
initiation criteria may drain resources, as staff are tempted to conduct risk analysis337
without first considering whether adherence to good practice would serve for sound risk338
management. At the other extreme, analysis may be applied reactively, perhaps even to339
provide ex post justifications of investment decisions (e.g. Health and Safety340
Laboratory, 2003).341
4.2.2. Stakeholder engagement342
A further positive characteristic of the utility’s approach to risk analysis was the343
reflection of a broad spectrum of knowledge, skills, experience and perspectives within344
each function’s approach to risk analysis. One benefit of their primarily qualitative345
approach was that it ensured that non-specialists, or what one interviewee referred to as346
“the people that use the systems, use the equipment and undertake the processes,”347
could actively participate in and critically scrutinise the process. This is key, as348
engaging operational staff who have practical knowledge of the hazards under349
examination ensures a sense of ownership and engagement in the process, as opposed350
to accountabilities residing within a core set of head-office experts isolated from351
operational reality.352
4.2.3. Competence353
As Rosness (1998) notes, the accuracy of risk analyses depends to a large extent354
on the competency of analysts to critically evaluate information and integrate it with355
their own knowledge and assumptions. A need for education and training in risk356
analysis remains irrespective of the technical complexity of the methods adopted.357
Aside from the ubiquitous “on the job” training, two elementary programmes were358
observed within our sub-sample: (i) internally delivered training modules within359
occupational health and safety, comprising an overview of the relevant legislation, the360
risk analysis process, and some practical exercises; and (ii) voluntary external modules361
for HAZOP facilitators and project managers. However, formal definitions of the362
competencies required of risk analysts and metrics for assessing whether they had been363
imparted were absent, leading one to question on what basis education and training in364
risk analysis was targeted, assessed and improved. This critique is not restricted to our365
sub-sample; there is a broader need for research on (i) the attributes and characteristics366
of competent risk analysts; (ii) how they can be developed within staff; and (iii) how367
the vigilance secured can then be measured and retained.368
4.2.4. Verification: quality control369
The quality control of risk analyses is intended to enhance their credibility370
through addressing inherent uncertainties, both epistemic, due to lack of knowledge,371
and operational, derived from the use of knowledge (e.g. analyst bias, judgements,372
human error; see Faber and Stewart, 2003; Amendola, 2001). This aspect was perhaps373
a core weakness of the sub-sample. For example, peer reviews of risk analysis were374
executed in a largely informal and unsystematic manner, whilst the use of facilitators375
was restricted to project risk analysis and HAZOP studies. That said, the role of the376
latter should not be underplayed, as our interviews emphasised that they did not drive377
particular outcomes or provide specific technical input, but sought to guide analysts in378
the application of methods and focus on the quality of process execution (e.g.379
challenging outliers during consequence evaluation, ensuring all relevant risk380
categories were considered during hazard identification).381
With formalised quality control mechanisms being the exception rather than the382
norm, there was an implicit reliance on analyst competencies, a presumed absence of383
bias, and an assumed validity of the methods adopted. In practice, all risk analyses384
have inherent limitations and are based on assumptions rarely made explicit, and385
arguably, their applications are not scientific in a classical sense, but rather draw on the386
accumulated experiences, knowledge and bias of analysts (Aven et al., 2006). As such,387
ignorance, assumptions, value judgements, and local perspectives distort analysis388
outcomes from true objectivist ideals. Given this, the utility’s rescinding of the Delphi389
technique within their project risk analysis was disappointing. Historically, facilitated390
discussions and iterative anonymous voting had been used to generate consensus in risk391
evaluation. Characterised by group participation, anonymity and feedback loops, it392
minimised bias and dogma (e.g. reduced the reluctance of staff to abandon previously393
stated views). One interviewee suggested that since the approach had been abandoned,394
evaluations tended to reflect the subjective judgement of lone experts, which “typically395
went unchallenged.” This may be viewed as a pyrrhic victory for those who railed396
against this symbol of “bureaucracy,” and a timely warning that the much maligned397
concepts of due process, of checks and balances, can suppress greater evils.398
4.3. Risk based decision making: observed practices399
Table 6 summarises risk based decision making practice within the sub-sample.400
Below, we evaluate the strengths and limitations of a selection of these practices.401
4.3.1. Establish criteria for evaluating alternative risk management options402
A range of risk management measures may be considered for a particular403
decision. Consider drinking water quality management. Options for reducing risks to404
public health posed by waterborne pathogens include: enhancing the monitoring of405
indicator organisms in source waters (e.g. E. coli), catchment protection (e.g. fencing,406
or exclusion zones for livestock), infrastructure upgrades (e.g. filtration flow control),407
chlorine residual monitoring and operator training. The objective of each option is to408
reduce the risk to a level considered acceptable. The decision as to which option(s) is409
considered the best is influenced by many factors. Notwithstanding that all risk410
management decisions are value-laden, in best practice organisations these factors are411
reflected in explicit criteria used to evaluate the relative merit of alternative options.412
As cost benefit analysis is linked to determining of whether risk management413
options satisfy the “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) criteria adopted within414
the sub-sample, it is tempting to consider the balancing of costs and benefits as an415
evaluation criterion. However, we propose cost benefit analysis is best viewed as a416
methodology for evaluating the relative utility of a risk management option. It does not417
prescribe whether one should simply balance the financial expense of implementing an418
option with the benefits of the risk reduction, or whether one should incorporate less419
tangible aspects such as technical feasibility, social values such as equity and420
distribution, or political concerns. In other words, it leaves the evaluation criteria421
unspecified. Whilst our research revealed that a broad range of criteria guided the422
evaluation of risk management options within our sub-sample, they were only made423
explicit within asset management’s risk-based approach to prioritising mains424
replacement and dam safety upgrades (Table 6). As such, one can expect what Arvai et425
al. (2001) termed “alternative focussed” decision making to predominate. This is426
characterised by an analysis of available alternatives followed by selection of the427
“optimal” option from a set of implied or poorly defined criteria. It is not desirable for428
a decision process to dictate or prescribe decisions, as an overly mechanical approach429
fails to recognise the human aspects of performing difficult value judgements under430
uncertainty (Aven et al., 2006). However, expressing the criteria against which those431
judgements should be taken ensures that the rationale for decisions is constructed a432
priori in a deliberative manner, rather than rationalised post hoc. Aside from433
improving risk management, explicit criteria serve to better equip utilities to manage434
risk issues, as they (i) provide a mechanism for reflecting legitimate stakeholder435
concerns in utility decision making (e.g. by incorporating public values and436
preferences); and (ii) provide a documented, defensible rationale for decision on risk.437
4.3.2. Identify risk management options438
This practice is concerned with generating alternative solutions for managing439
risk. Within the business functions, it was typically undertaken within creative440
workshops involving a diverse range of stakeholders. The value of brainstorming,441
which seeks to stimulate innovation through open interaction and feedback, was cited442
by various interviewees, one noting that it “empowers people to think; the worst [thing]443
that you can do is take away people’s creativity.” Furthermore, engaging stakeholders444
with diverse skills and backgrounds helps identify and address those assumptions,445
constraints and biases that can have a significant influence on the generation of446
alternatives (Aven and Kørte, 2003). Whilst primarily creative, within some functions447
this practice was informed by checklists of risk reduction alternatives. One example448
was occupational health and safety management’s hierarchy of risk controls (control449
banding), which classified: engineering controls for hazard removal (e.g. substitution,450
isolation, modification to design, guarding and mechanical ventilation); administrative451
controls for preventing the occurrence of hazardous events (e.g. safe work practices, or452
procedures, training, supervision, nominating maximum exposure times); and personal453
protective equipment for minimising their severity of consequences.454
Perhaps the most important factor was the depth and rigour of the risk analyses.455
Consider risk analysis within drinking water quality management. Recall that hazards456
identified within each subsystem (e.g. catchment: pathogens) were linked to their457
sources (e.g. dairy farming or grazing) and the events that may lead to their realisation458
(e.g. runoff or percolation from land based activities). Detailed surveys were459
undertaken exploring the adequacy of design, management and operation of those460
actions, activities and processes applied to mitigate the introduction or transport of said461
hazards from catchment to customer tap (e.g. catchment protection, pre-treatment,462
ozonation, etc.). We propose that systematically identifying the underlying463
mechanisms through which hazardous events may occur, before evaluating the latent464
and active weaknesses in their control mechanisms, is the normative approach to465
identifying risk management options. The overarching purpose of risk analysis should466
be to develop a better understanding of the factors governing system reliability, rather467
than a “numbers game” (e.g. to simply satisfy quantitative risk acceptance criteria;468
Faber and Stewart, 2003). When used diagnostically, risk analysis represents an469
efficient tool for improving system safety and performance.470
4.3.3. Evaluate options471
We now turn to the evaluation of risk management options. There are three472
elements to this practice: (i) forecasting the impact of options against each evaluation473
criteria (e.g. technical feasibility); (ii) determining the relative merit of each option; and474
(iii) determining the acceptability of the residual risk, post-implementation.475
Methods for achieving the former within our sub-sample of business functions476
included applying professional judgement, stakeholder consultations, cost-estimations,477
and engineering studies (e.g. feasibility studies in major dam safety management). This478
said, recall that in most business functions evaluation criteria were not defined, and so479
this element often tended towards the informal or implicit. For the second element, the480
cost-benefit approach was widely adopted for assessing the relative merit of alternative481
risk management options. Formal mathematical analyses were restricted to risk482
management options that took the form of major capital projects (e.g. in major dam483
safety management). More commonly, managerial judgement was used to balance484
costs and benefits, at times informed by cost-effectiveness evaluations of risk reduction485
per unit (Euro) spent. Thus, the determination of whether risks satisfied the ALARP486
criteria was judgement-based, rather than informed by an explicit evaluation of the487
costs and benefits of reducing vs. maintaining risk levels.488
We present two justifications for the variable rigour and formality that489
characterised this practice: (i) that the resources expended in decision analysis must be490
justified by the benefit of better decisions, and so detailed analysis is neither desirable491
nor justifiable for every decision; and (ii) that evaluation criteria incorporating492
intangible dimensions are difficult to incorporate within the analytic framework of cost493
benefit analysis.494
4.4. Risk based decision making: maturity of implementation495
The sub-sample’s risk based decision making profile mirrors that of risk analysis496
(Fig. 2). However, the decision making processes were less mature, and characterised497
by a lesser degree of definition. One implication is that we may expect a lesser degree498
of rigour and formality in risk based decision making. Perhaps this reflects an499
organisational culture that values judgement, intuition, and creativity of decision above500
prescription. However, our model is intended to guide, not prescribe, decision making501
with the objective of encouraging a high degree of consistency, credibility, and502
confidence in the outcomes. In the absence of a clear framework, people struggle to503
identify their full range of values and concerns in a given decision context, and are ill-504
equipped to perform the complex trade-offs common to risk based decision making505
(Arvai et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 1977; Payne et al., 1992; Slovic, 1995; Matheson and506
Matheson, 1998). It does not require a strong grasp of decision theory to conclude that507
an aversion to decision frameworks, however motivated, is not conducive to sound risk508
management.509
510
5. Discussion511
We now critically evaluate our contribution, which is three-fold. We have (a)512
synthesised empirical observations with prior behavioral and normative risk research to513
codify the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making; (b) placed these514
processes within a maturity framework that distinguishes between levels of515
implementation, from ad hoc to adaptive; and (c) provided a comparative analysis of516
risk analysis and risk based decision making across a range of utility business517
functions.518
519
5.1. Coding of risk analysis520
Consider the codification of risk analysis (Fig. 1; Table 1), best described by521
reference to the prominent risk frameworks that adopt an organisation-wide focus (e.g.522
COSO, 2004; AS/NZS, 1999, 2004; FERMA, 2003) and those for drinking water523
quality management (NZMOH, 2001; NHMRC, 2001, 2004; WHO, 2002, 2004). Our524
inclusion of exposure assessment is distinctive because strategic risk management525
frameworks tend to focus on finding sources of potential harm, to the neglect of the526
underlying pathways that lead to their realisation (i.e. how and why hazardous events527
may occur). This focus on root causes is mirrored in our treatment of control528
evaluation, which involves identifying and assessing existing technical, physical and529
administrative controls. These are important advances, because the neglect of causal530
pathways to failure and latent weaknesses in system defences impedes the development531
of risk management measures targeted at the root causes, and therefore, promotes a532
focus on hazard, rather than risk, management.533
We have placed consequence evaluation prior to likelihood evaluation. The534
majority of frameworks consider the order in which they are performed to be535
interchangeable, or at least make no explicit reference to the matter (e.g. COSO, 2004;536
AS/NZS, 1999, 2004; FERMA, 2003). Our reasoning is that the outcome(s) should be537
defined prior to any evaluation of the likelihood of occurrence. If these steps are538
performed in reverse, likelihood evaluation tends to be concerned only with the539
likelihood of a hazardous event occurring (e.g. the probability of asset failure), rather540
than with the likelihood of an event occurring and leading to a defined outcome (e.g.541
the probability of an asset failing and leading to a given environmental impact). The542
former approach overestimates risk. This is not a purely theoretical danger; our543
research has revealed instances of its occurrence (MacGillivray et al., 2007b).544
545
5.2. Coding of risk based decision making546
Strategic risk management frameworks (e.g. COSO, 2004; AS/NZS, 1999, 2004;547
FERMA, 2003) conventionally treat risk based decision making, namely the548
identification, evaluation and selection of options to manage risks, in a somewhat549
cursory manner. And so the novelty of our coding (Fig. 1; Table 2) is best illustrated550
with reference to the decision theory literature. Notably, we have separated “evaluate551
options” into three elements: (i) forecasting the impact of options against each552
evaluation criteria (e.g. technical feasibility); (ii) determining the relative merit of each553
option; and (iii) determining the acceptability of the residual risk associated with each554
option. We believe this provides an important advance to option evaluation, moving555
beyond the notion that the acceptability of a risk can be determined without considering556
the costs and benefits of maintaining vs. reducing risk levels (e.g. in using measures of557
risk as proxies for risk acceptability).558
We also highlight our inclusion of managerial review and option selection prior to559
the final risk management decision. Whilst not novel (e.g. Aven et al., 2006), it is560
crucial because it highlights our view that decision analysis should compliment, but not561
replace, the knowledge, intuitions and judgement of decision makers (Mintzberg,562
1994). Further, risk based decisions should not reflect theoretically or analytically563
derived perspectives that run counter to sound professional judgement (Hrudey and564
Hrudey, 2003). More specifically, it emphasises that because risk is at heart, an565
expression of uncertainty (Amendola, 2001), the outputs of a decision analysis must be566
treated diagnostically rather than deterministically, i.e., they should provide decision567
support, not carte blanche decisions.568
569
5.3. Coding of maturity570
Our research applies capability maturity modelling principles to the processes of571
risk analysis and risk based decision making (Tables 3 and 4). It allows users to572
distinguish the relative maturity of implementation of risk analysis and risk based573
decision making, presumed to correlate this with performance in managing risk. The574
origins and logic of the hierarchy of maturity levels, particularly regarding the selection575
and definition of attributes used to define process maturity, are summarised in Table 3576
(for more detail, see MacGillivray, 2007c). This hierarchy is the heart of our model,577
and the most valuable contribution by virtue of its usefulness as discussed below.578
579
5.4. Utility of the model for benchmarking580
Throughout our work we have been concerned with improving risk management581
practice and we are interested in vigilance on the ground. Hence we ask, who may use582
the model we have developed, and what will it enable them to do that they were583
previously unable to? The most obvious function of the model is as a tool for research584
on the form and, crucially, implementation of risk management within industry. At a585
basic level, this is valuable, because published investigations of the latter tend towards586
the anecdotal rather than methodologically rigorous (e.g. Dalgleish and Cooper, 2005;587
Aabo et al., 2005). From an organisational perspective, its principal function is588
benchmarking, which enables organisations to compare themselves against others in589
their sector and beyond, and to identify and incorporate best practices. This is crucial590
because risk management remains ethereal to many in terms of practice on the ground,591
creating a need for the systematic evaluation of strengths and weaknesses and the592
sharing of best practice. It may also be used to drive improvements in the capabilities593
of key suppliers and partners (e.g. through using maturity evaluations to inform594
supplier selection). Finally, we consider its potential within regulation, envisaging that595
it may facilitate a step-change in the approach to regulating risk within utility sectors596
from its current focus on reactive, outcome based approaches (e.g. water quality597
standards) and prescriptions (e.g. codes and regulations), towards a proactive,598
capability based approach.599
600
5.5. Empirical findings601
Finally, we consider the contribution of our case study observations in their own602
right. Three observations bear emphasising: descriptive risk research; a focus on the603
implementation of risk management; and a cross-functional perspective. We highlight604
the first due to the lack of theoretically informed descriptive risk research within the605
water utility sector. The importance of the second is borne out by casting our eyes606
beyond this sector, where one observes that academic treatments of risk management607
tend to focus on technical and normative aspects, rather than institutional, behavioural,608
or descriptive facets, which our findings stress. Finally, our function-specific approach609
counters the concept of “enterprise wide risk management,” which appears to have610
created a majority opinion amongst its practitioners that risk management is an over-611
arching strategic discipline rather than a devolved process with variations and nuances612
of application within individual business functions.613
614
6. Conclusions615
We present a capability maturity model for benchmarking and improving risk616
analysis and risk based decision making, and illustrate its application to a cross-section617
of water and wastewater utility functions within a single utility. The insight offered is618
three-fold:619
 a synthesis of empirical observations with behavioral and normative risk620
research to codify the processes of risk analysis and risk based decision making;621
 an arrangement of these processes within a maturity framework that622
distinguishes their relative maturity of implementation from ad hoc to adaptive;623
 a critical evaluation of the methods, techniques and maturity of risk analysis and624
risk based decision making across a range of utility functions.625
These findings provide researchers, utility managers, engineers, asset managers,626
occupational health and safety representatives, public health officials, project managers,627
chief finance officers and regulators a deeper understanding of the practical form and628
theoretical underpinnings of risk management, and how distinctions can be made629
between organisational capabilities. This addresses an important gap in the literature630
because, although the premise that institutional capacities rather than technical aspects631
are the fundamental limiting factor in implementing risk management has earlier632
origins (e.g. Garrick, 1988; Luehrman, 1997; Strutt, 2006), there remains a dearth of633
descriptive research on the practical form of risk management within the utility sectors634
and, particularly, how it may be embedded. The latter is the subject of our ongoing635
research.636
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Fig. 1. Risk analysis (left) and risk based decision making practices (right). Those encased784
are considered key rather than critical, an important distinction in evaluating process785
maturity.786
System characterisation
Hazard identification
Exposure assessment
Consequence evaluation
Likelihood evaluation
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Establish criteria for evaluating alternative risk
reduction options
Identify risk management options
Evaluate options
Managerial review and option(s) selection
Establish risk acceptance criteria
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Key: DWQM: drinking water quality management; AM: asset management; OH&S: occupational health and safety796
management; ENG: engineering; PM: project management.797
798
Fig. 2. Spider diagram illustrating the maturity of implementation of risk analysis (left)799
and risk based decision making (right) within the sub-sample (insufficient data was800
obtained to evaluate the latter within engineering).801
Table 1 Descriptions of the risk analysis practices and of the rationale for their inclusion in our802
model803
Risk analysis
practice
Description Rationale
System
characterisation
To establish and describe the system
with which risk analysis is
concerned (e.g. workplace,
engineering process, project).
A comprehensive system understanding is a
sine qua non for generating risk analysis
outcomes that are valid and accepted by
stakeholders.
Hazard
identification
Identifying situations, events, or
substances with the potential for
causing adverse consequences, i.e.
sources of harm or threats to the
system.
A hazard left unidentified is excluded from
subsequent analysis.
Exposure
assessment
Whilst hazard identification is
concerned with what can go wrong,
The potential existence of a hazard does not
in itself constitute a risk, as each hazard
1
2
3
4
5
PM
ENG
OH&SAM
DWQM
1
2
3
4
5
PM
ENG
OH&SAM
DWQM
precursor identification focuses on
how and why things can go wrong,
in other words identifying possible
routes to and causes of failure.
requires a process or pathway (precursor) to
lead to its realisation. Thus, the value of this
practice lies in both confirming the existence
of pathways to failure (and therefore that a
risk exists) and informing the development
of risk management options focussed at root
causes.
Control
evaluation
The identification and assessment of
existing technical, physical and
administrative controls which may
either reduce the likelihood of a
hazardous event occurring, or serve
to mitigate its severity of
consequences. Assessment should
address both the criticality of the
controls (e.g. based on their inherent
capacity to reduce risk, whether they
are proactive or reactive, etc.) and
their adequacy of design,
management and operation.
An evaluation of existing controls: informs
the evaluation of associated risk levels;
serves to inform the development of risk
management options through identifying
latent and active control weaknesses (i.e.
through serving as a gap analysis of existing
risk management measures); and captures
the historic basis for safe, reliable system
operation.
Consequence
evaluation
Identifying the nature of the
consequences of a hazardous event
occurring (e.g. financial,
environmental) and assessing their
severity of impact.
Likelihood
evaluation
The evaluation of the likelihood (i.e.
frequency or probability) that a
hazardous event will occur and lead
to a defined severity of
consequence.
Risk evaluation Combining measures of likelihood
and consequence severity to derive
an overall measure of risk, either
qualitative (e.g. high, low) or
quantitative (e.g. expected loss of
life, value at risk).
Deriving and combining measures of
consequence and likelihood are required to
establish the overall level of risk associated
with a given hazard, so that management
resources may be allocated accordingly and
to assess the desirability of potential risk
management measures (e.g. to see if they
satisfy the ALARP criteria).
Table 2 Descriptions of the risk based decision making practices and of the rationale for their804
inclusion in our model805
Risk based
decision
making
practice
Description Rationale
Establish
risk
acceptance
criteria
Establishing criteria for
evaluating the acceptability of
risk.
In the absence of such criteria, on what basis are
decisions taken on whether to mitigate or accept
risk?
Establish
criteria for
evaluating
alternative
risk
management
options
Establishing criteria used to
evaluate the relative merit of
alternative risk management
options (e.g. forecast risk
reduction, technical
feasibility, cost of
implementation, latency of
effects, environmental
impacts, etc.) and, where
deemed appropriate (e.g.
where multi-attribute analysis
is subsequently undertaken),
weightings to establish their
relative importance.
A range of risk management options may be
considered for a particular decision context; the
decision as to which is considered the best option is
influenced by many factors. Different concerns and
values often need to be considered simultaneously,
and their relative importance may be valued
differently by various stakeholders (Faber and
Stewart, 2003). Making this explicit in the form of
criteria can improve the credibility and defensibility
of decision making, minimise the possibility that
decisions will be second guessed or that their
rationale be forgotten, remove barriers to
stakeholder buy-in, and ensure the existence of an
audit trail (SEI, 2002). More broadly, it enables
value rather than “alternative focussed” decision
making, the latter being characterised by the
selection of an “optimal” option from a set of
implied or poorly defined criteria (Arvai et al.,
2001).
Identify risk
management
options
Generating alternative
solutions for the decision
problem.
Options not generated are excluded from subsequent
evaluation and, ultimately, implementation.
Evaluate
options
There are three elements to
this: forecasting the impact of
each option against the
individual evaluation criteria;
determining the relative merit
of each option (e.g. via cost-
benefit analysis, multi-
attribute analysis); and
determining risk
acceptability.
Systematically evaluating the individual and
cumulative merits of alternative options should
provide for more credible, defensible and rational
risk based decision making. Determining risk
acceptability follows as it is risk management
options, not risks, which are unacceptable or
acceptable (Fischoff et al., 1981), i.e. the
acceptability of risk cannot be determined without
considering the costs and benefits of maintaining vs.
reducing current risk levels.
Managerial
review and
option(s)
selection
The application of managerial
judgement in reviewing the
premises, assumptions, and
limitations of analyses, prior
to the final decision (after
Aven et al., 2006).
In line with Mintzberg (1994), we consider that
decision analysis should compliment, but not
replace, the knowledge, intuitions and judgement of
decision makers, and further, that risk based
decisions should not reflect theoretically or
analytically derived perspectives that run counter to
sound professional judgement (Hrudey and Hrudey,
2003). More specifically, given that risk is, at a
fundamental level, an expression of uncertainty, and
that the analysis of risk and decision alternatives is
further subject to aleatory, epistemic and operational
uncertainty (Amendola, 2001), the outputs must be
treated diagnostically rather than deterministically,
i.e., they should provide decision support, not
decisions.
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Table 3 Descriptions of the risk analysis process maturity attributes and their rationale for inclusion within our model
Attribute Description Rationale Key aspects
Procedures The rules guiding the
execution of risk analysis.
Procedures serve to capture and disseminate
knowledge of the optimal conduct of risk analysis
so that it is maintained within the organisational
memory rather than as hidden expert knowledge
(NEA/CSNI, 1999), and so ensure its consistent,
efficient conduct.
Appropriate standardisation and formalisation of procedures taking
into account personnel experience and knowledge; participation of
end users (e.g. risk analysts) in their development; matching detail
with complexity of work; making explicit the rationale for
conducting risk analyses; being based on an analysis of the tasks
required (NEA/CSNI, 1999; Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003).
Roles and
responsibilities
Assignment of personnel to
risk analysis roles and
responsibilities.
To avoid the “not my job” phenomenon (Joy and
Griffiths, 2005), and ensure risk analysis receives
appropriate focus and resource allocations.
Matching role descriptions and assignment of responsibilities with
personnel competencies and authorities (NEA/CSNI, 1999).
Supporting well meaning statements that “risk management is
everyone’s job” with specific requirements.
Initiation
criteria
Stages or conditions which
initiate risk analysis.
To ensure risk analyses is undertaken as required,
rather than being initiated on an ad hoc, over
zealous, or reactive basis, or marginalised as
“make work.”
Identifying where risk analysis is necessary vs. where adherence to
codes and standards can be said to discharge the duty (Health and
Safety Laboratory, 2003; UKOOA, 1999), and making this explicit
in cyclical and event-based criteria.
Resource
management
The planning, acquisition,
and deployment of funds,
techniques and staff in
support of risk analysis.
Resourcing of risk analysis is particularly critical
during periods of reduced budgets and downsizing,
which may bring an emphasis on economic rather
than safe operation (NEA/CSNI, 1999).
Sufficiency and availability of financial resources; access to
sufficiently competent human resources; and a range of risk analysis
techniques which reflect the complexity of the organisation’s
activities and working environment (Health and Safety Laboratory,
2003).
Input data
management
The identification,
collection, and storage of
risk analysis data inputs.
The systematic identification and capture of data
requirements serves to ensure analyses are
underpinned by objective data evaluation, rather
than reflecting best guesses in the guise of “expert
judgement.”
The definition of data requirements / data sources for risk analysis,
either at the process level or, where not practical, on a case by case
basis, and mapping these to data collection and storage systems.
Output data
management
The collection, storage and
dissemination of risk
analysis outputs.
Risk analysis outputs must be systematically
recorded to inform decision makers, for audit and
training purposes, and to facilitate future reviews
(COSO, 2004; CSA, 2004). Further, this ensures
staff have current knowledge of the human,
technical, organisational and environmental factors
that govern system safety (Reason, 1997).
Documenting in-depth the risk analysis outcomes, not simply the
overall level of risk (e.g. sources of data, assumptions used, methods
followed, etc.). Although in theory the storage media is unimportant
as long as the outputs are easily retrievable (Health and Safety
Laboratory, 2003), IT-based data systems (risk registers) have
significant advantages, particularly in facilitating information flow
between and across layers and boundaries of the organisation
(COSO, 2004).
Verification Ensuring compliance with
risk analysis procedures,
and providing quality
control of the execution of
risk analysis.
The mere existence of procedures is not in itself
enough to ensure that staff actions will be
consistent with them (Hoyle, 2001; ISO, 2000).
Errors of omission or commission (e.g. due to
misunderstanding instructions, carelessness,
fatigue or management override), may cause
deviations. Similarly, procedural compliance does
not ensure the quality of execution of risk analysis.
Implementation of mechanisms to ensure adherence to procedures
(e.g. auditing, “sign offs”) and to sanction non-compliance. Quality
control mechanisms (e.g. peer reviews, Delphi panels) should be
implemented with explicit methods for controlling (e.g. establishing
group consensus iteratively) or evaluating (e.g. quality criteria) the
quality of analyses. An appropriate balance between the resources
required, the constraints of bureaucracy, and the benefits of process
control should be struck.
Validation Assessing the fundamental
correctness of the risk
analysis process design
(e.g. that the correct
techniques are being
applied, that the correct
initiation criteria are in
place).
The willingness and means to question the validity
of current risk analysis practices is required to
show due diligence and ensure that current
practices are legitimate, and is further a
prerequisite to the continual improvement of risk
analysis.
Formalised approaches to validation include: statistical or
mathematical approaches to validating technical methodologies,
independent peer reviews, and benchmarking surveys; and
informally may draw upon: professional networks, trade and
scientific literature, etc.
Organisational
learning
The manner in which the
organisation identifies,
evaluates and implements
improvements to the design
and execution of risk
analysis.
Mechanisms for verification and validation are
mere panaceas if their findings are not acted upon,
i.e., if they are not used to rectify deficiencies in
the design and execution of risk analysis.
Reviews should: be undertaken at specified intervals and on an event
driven-basis; consider a broad range of internal and external
feedback; focus on improving the validity of the risk analysis
process and the effectiveness of its execution, not on ensuring it
complies with a given standard; treat errors of omission or
commission in the execution of risk analysis not as isolated lapses
requiring sanction to prevent their re-occurrence, but as
opportunities to identify and resolve root and common causes of
error; and be supported by a learning culture, wherein current
methods and approaches to risk analysis, and their underlying
assumptions, are open to question and critical evaluation.
Stakeholder
engagement
The engagement of
stakeholders, both internal
and external to the utility,
for the purpose of
harnessing a broad range of
perspectives, knowledge,
skills and experience.
The legitimacy of risk analysis outputs depends
upon appropriately broad stakeholder engagement,
as risk is an intrinsically multi-faceted construct,
whose comprehensive understanding is often
beyond the capabilities of individuals or small
groups.
A team approach to risk analysis which pools the knowledge, skills,
expertise and experience of a range of perspectives is preferable
(Health and Safety Laboratory, 2003; MHU, 2003; Joy and Griffiths,
2005). External stakeholders may be engaged to: capture expertise
(e.g. consultants); confer additional legitimacy on the analyses;
communicate due diligence (e.g. regulators); and capture community
values and ensure they are incorporated within the analysis.
Competence The ability to demonstrate
knowledge, skills, and
experience in risk analysis
to the level required
(Health and Safety
Laboratory, 2003).
The legitimacy of risk analyses outcomes depends
to a large extent on the capacity of staff to
critically evaluate available information and to
supplement it with their own knowledge and
plausible assumptions (Rosness, 1998) , i.e. on
staff competencies.
Definition of required staff competencies in risk analysis; evaluation
and implementation of appropriate education and training vehicles to
develop / maintain those competencies (e.g. class room learning,
external workshops); providing “on the job” training under adequate
supervision; designing and implementing methods for evaluating the
efficacy of educating and training (e.g. for measuring that the
required competencies have been imparted).
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Table 4 Descriptions of the risk analysis process maturity hierarchy, from ad hoc to adaptive1
Validation
A broad range of mechanisms are in place to capture feedback potentially
challenging the validity of the risk analysis process (e.g. benchmarking
surveys, professional networks, external peer reviews, mathematical
validation of technical methodologies).
LEVEL 5:
Adaptive
Organisational
learning
Norms and assumptions underpinning the design of the risk analysis process
are openly questioned, critically evaluated and, where appropriate, revised in
light of validation findings (i.e. double loop learning).
Verification
Verification extends beyond rigorous mechanisms to ensure procedural
compliance (e.g. sign offs supplemented by in-depth audits) to provide formal
quality control of risk analyses (e.g. peer reviews, challenge procedures,
external facilitation, Delphi technique, etc.).LEVEL 4:
Controlled
Organisational
learning
Root and common causes of errors in the execution of risk analysis (e.g.
deficient communication, overly complex procedures, lack of education and
training) are identified and resolved. Modifications to the design of the
process are identified, evaluated and implemented within periodic and event-
driven reviews, but remain largely reactive and externally driven (i.e.
mirroring changes to codes, standards, guidelines, etc.).
The critical and key risk analysis practices are explicitly undertaken.
Procedures Procedures exist to guide the execution of risk analysis, with an appropriatedegree of standardisation, detail, and complexity.
Roles and
responsibilities
Risk analysis roles and responsibilities are allocated with sufficient regard for
staff competencies and authorities.
Initiation
Criteria
Cyclical and event-based criteria are in place to guide the initiation of risk
analyses.
Resource
management
The requisite monetary, human and technical resources are identified,
acquired and deployed in support of risk analysis.
Input data
management
The requisite data inputs are identified, acquired and deployed in support of
risk analysis.
Output data
management
Risk analysis outputs are collected, stored and disseminated in a manner that
supports decision-making, satisfies audit requirements, and facilitates
organisational learning.
Verification
Basic mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance with risk analysis
procedures, focussing on outputs rather than tasks performed (e.g. sign offs
on receipt of completed risk analyses).
Validation The validity of the risk analysis process is questioned in light of changes toregulations, codes and standards.
Organisational
learning
Non-compliances with risk analysis procedures are resolved on a case by case
basis (i.e. treated as isolated errors requiring sanction to prevent their
recurrence). Improvements to the design of the risk analysis process are
implemented in a reactive, ad hoc manner (e.g. in response to changes in
codes or regulations).
Stakeholder
engagement
A broad cross section of internal and external knowledge, experience, skills
and perspectives is reflected within risk analysis, based on explicit guidelines
or criteria for stakeholder engagement.
LEVEL 3:
Defined
Competence
Staff exhibit adequate knowledge, skills and experience in risk analysis.
Education and training in risk analysis is planned and executed based on
established competency requirements.
LEVEL 2:
Repeatable The critical risk analysis practices are explicitly undertaken.
LEVEL 1:
Ad hoc
Risk analysis is absent; or the critical practices are implicitly or incompletely
performed.
41
Table 5 Summary of the undertaking of each risk analysis practice within the sub-sample1
Asset managementDrinking water quality management Occupational health and safety
management Treatment plants Major dams*
Project management Engineering
System
characterisation
Schematics of water supply systems
were produced. Data was obtained
to characterise the following system
elements: catchment (e.g.
geomorphology, climate, land uses);
source water (e.g. surface or ground
water, flow and reliability, seasonal
changes); storage tanks, reservoirs
and intakes (e.g. detention times,
design); treatment and distribution
systems (e.g. processes,
configuration, monitoring); current
operational procedures; point
sources of pollution; and consumers
(e.g. population, demand patterns).
Checklists were used to
interrogate characteristics of
the work spaces and the type
and methods of work to be
undertaken (e.g. existence /
location of pits, shafts, ducts,
pressure vessels, access and
egress routes, ventilation,
isolation and lockout
procedures, substances used,
etc.).
Plant
components
were identified,
their condition
and performance
evaluated
through asset
inspections, and
current operating
and maintenance
regimes detailed.
Engineering
assessments of dams
were undertaken,
drawing on technical
reports, site visits,
flood and earthquake
loadings, dam safety
standards, etc.
Project options were
characterised through
scope development and
value management
workshops. These
detailed the project
need and relevant
assumptions and
constraints, before
characterising each
option in terms
including their:
functional
specifications,
capacities, required
inputs and outputs, and
relative costs and
benefits.
Prior to the application
of HAZOP studies,
process and
instrumentation
diagrams – which show
the interconnection of
process equipment and
the instrumentation
used for process control
– were created.
Hazard
identification
Chemical, microbiological, physical
and radiological water quality
hazards (e.g. chlorine sensitive
pathogens) were identified on a
Hazards were identified via
the use of task, substance and
workplace specific checklists.
Where deemed relevant, this
A FMECA-type
approach linked
potential hazards
(e.g. supernatant
Significant failure
modes (flood,
earthquake, and static
loading) were
Hazards threatening the
delivery of the project
option(s) on time, to
budget, and within the
HAZOP studies
identified potential
deviations from process
design intent (i.e.
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system and sub-system (e.g.
catchment, treatment) specific basis
through a checklist-based approach.
was supplemented by systems
engineering techniques,
incident and near miss
records, and brainstorming.
identified. required quality
parameters, were
identified through
facilitated
brainstorming,
structured with
reference to generic
hazard categories.
hazards) through the
application of guide
words (e.g. low, high,
none) to process
parameters (e.g. ozone
flow).
Exposure
assessment
Knowledge of the environmental
behaviour of hazards and the system
under examination, technical
judgement, incident reports, survey
maps, and monitoring records were
synthesised to link hazards (e.g.
chlorine sensitive pathogens) to their
sources (e.g. dairy farming or
grazing) and to the events which
may lead to their realisation (e.g.
runoff or percolation from land
based activities).
There was an absence of
explicit provisions for
identifying the precursors to
identified hazards, one
exception being for hazards
arising from manual handling
activities, where checklists
examined which aspects of the
actions and movements,
workplace layout, and
working posture generated
said hazards.
overflows to
surroundings or
temporary
pipework
pumps) to their
direct causes
(e.g. not enough
capacity to hold
or evaporate
sludge received)
for each
component and
for the plant as a
whole. Informed
by site visits,
incident records,
and feedback
from operating
and maintenance
staff.
No inference
possible.
Hazards (e.g. aqueduct
erosion) were linked to
their direct causes (e.g.
major storm runoff;
water release from
failed stormwater
dams).
Engineering judgement
was applied to identify
potential causes of
deviations from design
intent (e.g. human
error: acts of omission
or commission;
equipment failure; and
external events).
Control
evaluation
Actions, activities and processes
applied to mitigate the introduction
or transport of hazards from
catchment to customer tap (e.g.
catchment protection, pre-treatment,
Health and safety risk controls
were identified with reference
to a control hierarchy which
established their relative
criticality: engineering (e.g.
Not observed to
have been
explicitly
undertaken.
The influence of
structural and non-
structural (e.g. early
warning systems)
controls was
Not observed to have
been explicitly
undertaken.
Systems or procedures
designed to prevent,
detect, provide early
warning, or mitigate the
consequences of a
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ozonation) were identified via a
checklist-type approach applied to
system schematics. Critical controls
were identified via set criteria.
Technical data, consultations with
operators, and site visits informed
survey-based evaluations of their
adequacy of design, management
and operation with reference to key
attributes (e.g. infrastructure;
planning, procedures and legislation;
monitoring; and auditing).
substitution, isolation, design
modification, guarding),
administrative (e.g. training,
supervision, procedures), and
personal protective equipment.
No explicit provision for
evaluating their adequacy of
design, management or
operation.
incorporated within
the modelling of
failure scenarios (i.e.
within event trees,
dam break modelling,
etc.).
deviation (i.e.
safeguards) were
identified. No explicit
provision for evaluating
their adequacy of
design, management or
operation.
Consequence
evaluation
This may be generalised as the judgement-based interpretation of limited data sets describing the nature and severity of consequences of past hazardous events (e.g. in
occupational health and safety: cost of claims, lost time due to incidents) to derive a credible evaluation of the potential consequence(s) of uncertain future events.
Evaluations were near uniformly characterised with reference to descriptors of the nature (e.g. environmental, financial) and severity of consequences of events
enshrined within the utility’s portfolio of risk ranking techniques. However, isolated applications of mathematical modelling (e.g. event tree analysis, dam break
modelling, inundation mapping, and economic impact evaluations in major dam risk analysis; event tree analysis in one occupational health and safety risk analysis
application) were observed.
Likelihood
evaluation
May be generalised as the judgement-based interpretation of data pertaining to the frequency of past hazardous events (e.g. water quality exceedence frequencies) in light
of analyst(s) knowledge, experience, and assumptions. Evaluations were near uniformly characterised with reference to likelihood benchmarks within risk ranking
techniques. However, isolated applications of mathematical modelling were observed (e.g. in major dam risk analysis, network reliability analysis, etc.).
Risk evaluation Outside of isolated risk analyses driven by consultants (e.g. notional costs of risk and statistical lives lost were derived in major dam risk analysis), risk was expressed in
qualitative terms (extreme, high, medium or low) derived by combining estimates of consequence severity and likelihood on a risk matrix.
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Table 6 Summary of the undertaking of each risk based decision making practice within the sub-sample1
2
Drinking water quality
management
Occupational health and
safety management
Asset management Project management
Establish risk acceptance
criteria
Corporate policy was to reduce risks to a level “as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).” The ALARP principle recognises that it would be
possible to spend infinite time, effort and money attempting to reduce a risk to zero, and reflects the idea that the benefits of risk reduction should
be balanced with the practicality of implementation. However, ALARP was not referred to within individual functions’ risk management
procedures, with the exception of OH&S and in major dam safety management. In the latter, risk acceptability considered three criteria: life
safety criteria; ALARP, and the de minimis risk concept, in order of stringency.
Establish criteria for
evaluating alternative risk
management options
Not explicitly defined.
Interviewees referred to cost,
time and effort required for
implementation; forecast risk
reduction; regulatory
compliance; risks introduced
(e.g. disinfection by-products);
geographical and technical
feasibility (e.g. site
constraints); operability;
manpower required; and social
and political concerns.
Not explicitly defined.
Forecast risk reduction,
cost of implementation,
and technical feasibility
were referred to by one
interviewee.
Defined for below ground major water
mains: qualitative risk reduction, cost
of implementation, and latency of
effects; for major dams: cost of
implementation, and forecast reduction
in statistical lives lost and economic
losses from dam failure events
(weighted to ensure preference for
reducing lives lost).
Not explicitly defined. Although project
managers were explicitly required to take
a cost-benefit approach in evaluating risk
management options, the scope of these
considerations, i.e. the criteria with which
costs and benefits were determined with
reference to, was not defined.
Identify risk management
options
Options (e.g. infrastructure
upgrades, fencing off sensitive
catchments, educating and
training operators) were
Options (e.g.
introducing standard
work practices) were
typically generated in
Options (e.g. for wastewater treatment
plants: capital projects, alterations to
operating or maintenance regimes,
contingency plans; for dams: structural
Options were typically generated by the
project manager in consultation with
relevant stakeholders (e.g. engineering
staff, environmental representatives), or
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generated by groups
responsible for the risk analysis
of each sub-system (e.g.
catchment) in consultation with
relevant specialists (e.g.
engineering, operations).
brainstorming sessions
involving a broad cross-
section of regional /
departmental staff, and,
where relevant, OH&S
staff.
and non structural measures, such as
installing external back up seals on
concrete faced rockfill dams, or early
warning systems, respectively) were
generated by those groups responsible
for the risk analysis of each asset class
in consultation with operating and
maintenance staff.
within the risk analysis workshops
through group brainstorming. This was
informed by predefined measures for:
reducing likelihood of occurrence (e.g.
audit and compliance programs, training,
preventative maintenance); reducing
impact of occurrence (e.g. contingency
planning, engineering and structural
barriers, early warning devices); and risk
transfer (e.g. contracts; insurance
arrangements).
The impact of
options against
individual
evaluation
criteria
Methods ranged from the application of professional judgement, to the revision of risk analyses (i.e. to derive the forecast risk reduction), to
stakeholder consultations, cost-estimations, and engineering studies (e.g. feasibility studies in major dam safety management). However, given
that in most cases the evaluation criteria were not explicitly defined, the undertaking of this tended towards the informal or implicit.
Determining
relative merit
of options
Largely informal and judgement-based, although the use of formal cost-benefit analysis was observed within asset management’s approach to
prioritising major dam safety upgrades, whilst cost effectiveness evaluations informed prioritisations of the replacement of below ground major
water mains. Furthermore, risk management options that took the form of capital projects valued in excess of approx. $150,000 (US) underwent
formal cost-benefit analysis as part of the capital approval process.
Evaluate
options
The
acceptability
of risk
The limited application of cost-benefit analysis in the context of evaluating risk management options meant that the determination of risk
acceptability was typically judgement-based.
Managerial review and
option(s) selection
Whilst our interviewees referred to peer reviews of varying formality as helping to shape the final option(s) selection across our sub-sample, the
data does not allow for a meaningful analysis of the roles of judgement, experience, bias, power structures, etc. in shaping decision outcomes.
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